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Abstract. We study a network extension to the Nash bargaining game, as introduced by Kleinberg
and Tardos [8], where the set of players corresponds to vertices in a graph G = (V,E) and each edge
ij ∈ E represents a possible deal between players i and j. We reformulate the problem as a cooperative
game and study the following question: Given a game with an empty core (i.e. an unstable game) is it
possible, through minimal changes in the underlying network, to stabilize the game? We show that by
removing edges in the network that belong to a blocking set we can find a stable solution in polynomial
time. This motivates the problem of finding small blocking sets. While it has been previously shown
that finding the smallest blocking set is NP-hard [3], we show that it is possible to efficiently find
approximate blocking sets in sparse graphs.
1 Introduction
In the classical Nash bargaining game [10], two players seek a mutually acceptable agreement on
how to split a dollar. If no such agreement can be found, each player i receives her alternative αi.
Nash’s solution postulates, that in an equilibrium, each player i receives her alternative αi plus half
of the surplus 1− α1 − α2 (if α1 + α2 > 1 then no mutually acceptable agreement can be reached,
and both players settle for their alternatives).
In this paper, we consider a natural network extension of this game that was recently introduced
by Kleinberg and Tardos [8]. Here, the set of players corresponds to the vertices of an undirected
graph G = (V,E); each edge ij ∈ E represents a potential deal between players i and j of unit
value. In Kleinberg and Tardos’ model, players are restricted to bargain with at most one of their
neighbours. Outcomes of the network bargaining game (NB) are therefore given by a matching
M ⊆ E, and an allocation x ∈ RV+ such that xi + xj = 1 for all ij ∈ M , and xi = 0 if i is
M -exposed; i.e., if it is not incident to an edge of M .
Unlike in the non-network bargaining game, the alternative αi of player is not a given parameter
but rather implicitly determined by the network neighbourhood of i. Specifically, in an outcome
(M,x), player i’s alternative is defined as
αi = max{1− xj : ij ∈ δ(i) \M}, (1)
where δ(i) is the set of edges incident to i. Intuitively, a neighbour j of i receives xj in her current
deal, and i may coerce her into a joint deal, yielding i a payoff of 1− xj .
An outcome (M,x) of NB is called stable if xi + xj ≥ 1 for all edges ij ∈ E, and it is balanced
if in addition, the value of the edges in M is split according to Nash’s bargaining solution; i.e., for
a matching edge ij, xi − αi = xj − αj .
Kleinberg and Tardos gave an efficient algorithm to compute balanced outcomes in a graph
(if these exist). Moreover, the authors characterize the class of graphs that admit such outcomes.
In the following main theorem of [8], a vertex i ∈ V is called inessential if there is a maximum
matching in G that exposes i.
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2Theorem 1 ([8]). An instance of NB has a balanced outcome iff it has a stable one. Moreover, it
has a stable outcome iff no two inessential vertices are connected by an edge.
The theory of cooperative games offers another useful angle for NB. In a cooperative game (with
transferable utility) we are given a player set N , and a valuation function v : 2N → R+; v(S) can
be thought of as the value that the players in S can jointly create. The matching game [6,13] is a
specific cooperative game that will be of interest for us. Here, the set of players is the set of vertices
V of a given undirected graph. The matching game has valuation function ν where ν(S) is the size
of a maximum matching in the graph G[S] induced by the vertices in S.
One goal in a cooperative game is to allocate the value v(N) of the so called grand coalition
fairly among the players. The core is in some sense the gold-standard among the solution concepts
that prescribe such a fair allocation: a vector x ∈ RN+ is in the core if (a) x(N) = v(N), and (b)
x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N , where we use x(S) as a short-hand for ∑i∈S xi. In the special case of
the matching game, this is seen to be equivalent to the following:
C(G) = {x ∈ RV+ : x(V ) = ν(V ) and xu + xv ≥ 1, ∀uv ∈ E}. (2)
Thus, the core of the matching game consists precisely of the set of stable outcomes of the corre-
sponding NB game. This was recently also observed by Bateni et al. [2] who remarked that the set
of balanced outcomes of an instance of NB corresponds to the elements in the intersection of core
and prekernel (the precise definition is not important at this point, and thus deferred to Section
3),of the associated matching game instance.
1.1 Dealing with unstable instances
Using the language of cooperative game theory and the work of Bateni et al. [2], we can rephrase
the main results of [8] as follows: Given an instance of NB, if the core of the underlying matching
game is non-empty then there is an efficient algorithm to compute a point in the intersection of
core and prekernel. Such an algorithm had previously been given by Faigle et al. in [7]. It is not
hard to see that the core of an instance of the matching game is non-empty if and only if the
fractional matching LP for this instance has an integral optimum solution. We state this LP and
its dual below; we let δ(i) denote the set of edges incident to vertex i in the underlying graph, and
use y(δ(i)) as a shorthand for the sum of ye over all e ∈ δ(i).
max
∑
e∈E
ye (P)
s.t. y(δ(i)) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ V
y ≥ 0
min
∑
i∈V
xi (D)
s.t. xi + xj ≥ 1 ∀ij ∈ E (3)
x ≥ 0,
LP (P) does of course typically have a fractional optimal solution, and in this case the core
of the corresponding matching game instances is empty. Core assignments are highly desirable for
their properties, but may simply not be available for many instances. For this reason, a number of
more forgiving alternative solution concepts like bargaining sets, kernel, nucleolus, etc. have been
proposed in the cooperative game theory literature (e.g., see [5,11]).
This paper addresses network bargaining instances that are unstable; i.e., for which the asso-
ciated matching game has an empty core. From the above discussion, we know that there is no
solution x to (D) that also satisfies 1Tx ≤ ν(V ). We therefore propose to find an allocation x of
ν(V ) that violates the stability condition in the smallest number of places. Formally, we call a set
B of edges a blocking set if there is x ∈ RV+ such that 1Tx ≤ ν(V ), and xi+xj ≥ 1 for all ij ∈ E \B.
3Blocking sets were previously discussed by Biro´ et al. [3]. The authors showed that finding
a smallest such set is NP-hard (via a reduction from maximum independent set). In this paper,
we complement this result by showing that approximate blocking sets can be computed in sparse
graphs. A graph G = (V,E) is ω-sparse for some ω ≥ 1 if for all S ⊆ V , the number of edges in the
induced graph G[S] is bounded by ω |S|. For example, if G is planar, then we may choose ω = 3 by
Euler’s formula.
Theorem 2. Given an ω-sparse graph G = (V,E), there is an efficient algorithm for computing
blocking sets of size at most 8ω + 2 times the optimum.
The main idea in our algorithm is a natural one: formulate the blocking set problem as a
linear program, and extract a blocking set from one of its optimal fractional solutions via an
application of the powerful technique of iterative rounding (e.g., see [9]). We first show that the
proposed LP has an unbounded integrality gap in general graphs, and is therefore not useful for the
design of approximation algorithms for such instances. We turn to the class of sparse graphs, and
observe that, even here, extreme points of the LP can be highly fractional, ruling out the direct
use of standard techniques. We carefully characterize problem extreme-points, and develop a direct
rounding method for them. Our approach exploits problem-specific structure as well as the sparsity
of the underlying graph.
Given a blocking set B, let E′ = E \ B be the non-blocking set edges, and let G′ = (V,E′) be
the induced graph. Notice that the matching game induced by G′ may still have an empty core,
and that the maximum matching in G′ may even be smaller than that in G. We are however able
to show that we can find a balanced allocation of ν(V ) as follows: let M ′ be a maximum matching
in G′, and define the alternative of player i as
α′i = max{1− xi : ij ∈ δG′(i) \M ′},
for all i ∈ V . Call an assignment x is balanced if it satisfies the stability condition (3) for all edges
ij ∈M ′, and
xi − α′i = xj − α′j ,
for all ij ∈M ′. A straight-forward application of an algorithm of Faigle et al. [7] yields a polynomial-
time method to compute such an allocation. We describe this algorithm in Section 3 for complete-
ness.
2 Finding small blocking sets in sparse graphs
We attack the problem of finding a small blocking set via iterative linear programming rounding.
In order to do this, it is convenient to introduce a slight generalization of the blocking set problem.
In an instance of the generalized blocking set problem (GBS), we are given a graph G = (V,E), a
partition E1 ∪ E2 of E, and a parameter ν ≥ 0. The goal is to find a blocking set B ⊆ E1, and an
allocation x ∈ RV+ such that 1Tx ≤ ν and xu + xv ≥ 1 for all uv ∈ E \ B, where 1 is a vector of
1s of appropriate dimension. The problem is readily formulated as an integer program. We give its
relaxation below on the left.
4min 1T z (PB)
s.t. xu + xv + zuv ≥ 1
∀uv ∈ E1 (4)
xu + xv ≥ 1
∀uv ∈ E2 (5)
1Tx ≤ ν (6)
x, z ≥ 0
max 1Ta+ 1T b− γ ν (DB)
s.t. a(δE1(u))+
b(δE2(u)) ≤ γ ∀u ∈ V (7)
a ≤ 1
a, b ≥ 0
The LP on the right is the dual of (PB). It has a variable ae for all e ∈ E1, a variable be for
all e ∈ E2, and variable γ corresponds to the primal constraint limiting 1Tx. We first show that
LP (PB) is not useful for finding approximate blocking sets in general graphs. To see this, we will
consider bipartite instances of the following form:
v1 v2 v3 v4 vn
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 um
X
Y
O
E2
E1
Our graphs will have a set V = X ∪ Y ∪ O, where X has n, Y has m, and O has 4m vertices,
respectively. The edges connecting sets X and Y belong to E2 and induce the complete bipartite
graph Kn,m. The edges between Y and O belong to the set E1. In our gap instance, we assume
m = 2n, and let ν = 2n− 1. In order to obtain a fractional solution to (PB), we let xv = 1− α if
v ∈ X, xv = α if v ∈ Y , and xv = 0 otherwise, for any v ∈ V , where α = (n − 1)/n. We also let
zuv = 1/n for all u ∈ Y , and v ∈ O. The solution is clearly feasible as 1Tx = 2n − 1, all E2 edges
are covered, and z is sufficiently large to ensure that E1 constraints are satisfied. The value of this
solution is 8n(1−α) = 8. We now show that any solution (x, z) to (PB) for which z is binary must
have value at least 4n. We do this by induction on n.
For n = 1, let v1 be the only X vertex. Since we have ν = 1, the only feasible solution to (PB)
is given by xv1 = 1, and xu = 0 otherwise. This forces zuv = 1 for all u ∈ Y, v ∈ O, and thus the
value of this solution is 8. Now consider the case where n > 1. Let u1 ∈ Y be a vertex with xu1 = 1.
If no such vertex exists, then we are done as then the blocking set has size at least 2n · 4 = 8n. Let
u2 ∈ Y be a vertex with xu2 < 1; such a vertex must also exist as the total x-value on the vertices
is bounded by 2n− 1. Now consider any vertex v1 ∈ X, and note that
xv1 + xu1 + xu2 ≥ 2,
by the feasibility of (x, z). Consider the graph G′ induced by X ′ = X \ {v1}, Y ′ = Y \ {u1, u2}, and
the neighbours O′ ⊆ O of vertices in Y ′, and let ν ′ = 2(n − 1) − 1. By induction, we know that a
feasible integral solution (x′, z′) for this instance must have value at least 4(n− 1). As
x(X ′ ∪ Y ′ ∪O′) ≤ 2n− 1− (xv1 + xu1 + xu2) ≤ 2(n− 1)− 1,
5there are at least 4(n − 1) edges in G′ that are not covered by x. Finally, x does not cover the 4
edges incident to u2, and hence (x, y) has value at least 4n.
Lemma 1. The integrality gap of (PB) is Ω(n), where n is the number of vertices in the given
instance of the blocking set problem.
Given this negative result, we will focus on sparse instances (G, ν) and prove Theorem 2. We
first characterize the extreme points of (PB).
2.1 Extreme points of (PB)
In the following, we assume that the underlying graph G is bipartite; this assumption will greatly
simplify our presentation, and will turn out to be w.l.o.g. Let (x, z) be a feasible solution of LP
(PB), and let A
=(x, z)T = b= be the set of tight constraints of the LP. It is well known (e.g.,
see [12] and also [9]) that (x, z) is an extreme point of the feasible region if A= has full column-
rank. In particular, (x, z) is uniquely determined by any full-rank sub-system A′(x, z)T = b′ of
A=(x, z)T = b=. If constraint (6) is not part of this system of equations, then
A′ = [A′′, I],
where A′′ is a submatrix of the edge-vertex incidence matrix of a bipartite graph, and I is an identity
matrix of appropriate dimension. Such matrices A′ are well-known to be totally unimodular (e.g., see
[12]), and (x, z) is therefore integral in this case. From now on, we therefore assume that constraint
(6) is tight, and that (x, z) is the unique solution to[
A′′ I
1T 0T
](
x¯
z¯
)
=
(
1
ν
)
, (8)
where A′′ is a submatrix of the edge, vertex incidence matrix of bipartite graph G, I is an identity
matrix, and 1T and 0T are row vectors of 1’s and 0’s, respectively. We obtain the following useful
lemma.
Lemma 2. Let (x, z) be a non-integral extreme point solution to (PB) satisfying (8). Then there
is an α ∈ (0, 1) such that xu, zuv ∈ {0, α, 1− α, 1} for all u ∈ V , and uv ∈ E1.
Proof. Standard linear algebra implies that the solution space to the the system [A′′ I](x¯, z¯)T is a
line; i.e., it has dimension 1. Hence, there are two extreme points (x1, z1) and (x2, z2) of the integral
polyhedron defined by constraints (4), (5), and the non-negativity constraints, and some α ∈ [0, 1]
such that (
x
z
)
= α
(
x1
z1
)
+ (1− α)
(
x2
z2
)
.
In fact, α must be in (0, 1) as (x, z) is assumed to be fractional. This implies the lemma. uunionsq
We call an extreme point good if there is a vertex u with xu = 1, or an edge uv ∈ E1 with
zuv ∈ {0} ∪ [1/3, 1]. Let us call an extreme point bad otherwise. We will now characterize the
structure of a bad extreme point (x, z). Let G = (V,E1 ∪ E2) be the bipartite graph for a given
GBS instance. Let T1 ⊆ E1 and T2 ⊆ E2 be E1 and E2 edges corresponding to tight inequalities
of (PB) that are part of the defining system (8) for (x, z). Let α be as in Lemma 2. Since (x, z) is
6bad, it must be that either α or 1− α is larger than 2/3; w.l.o.g., assume that α > 2/3. We define
the following useful sets:
X = {u ∈ V : xu = 1− α}
Y = {u ∈ V : xu = α}
O = {u ∈ V : xu = 0}.
Lemma 3. Let (x, z) be a bad extreme point. Using the notation defined above, we have
(a) zuv = (1− α) for all uv ∈ E1,
(b) O ∪X is an independent set in G
(c) Each T1 edge is incident to exactly one O and one Y vertex, and the edges of T2 form a tree
spanning X ∪ Y . Each edge in E is incident to exactly one Y vertex.
Proof. We know from Lemma 2 that zuv ∈ {0, 1− α, α, 1} for all uv ∈ E1; (a) follows now directly
from the fact that (x, z) is bad.
No two vertices u, v ∈ O can be connected by an edge, as such an edge uv must then have zuv = 1.
Similarly, no two vertices u, v ∈ X can be connected by an edge as otherwise zuv ≥ 1−2(1−α) > 1/3.
Finally, for an edge uv between O and X, we would have to have zuv ≥ 1 − (1 − α) > 2/3, which
once again can not be the case. This shows (b).
To see (c), consider first an edge uv in T1; we must have xu + xv = α, and this is only possible
if uv is incident to one O and one Y vertex. Similarly, xu + xv = 1 for all uv ∈ T2, and therefore
one of u and v must be in X, and one must be in Y . It remains to show that the edges in T2 induce
a tree. Let us first show acyclicity: suppose for the sake of contradiction that u1v1, . . . , upvp ∈ T2
form a cycle (i.e., u1 = vp). Then since G is bipartite, this cycle contains an even number of edges.
Let χ1, . . . , χp be the 0, 1-coefficient vector of the left-hand sides of the constraints belonging to
these edges. We see that
p∑
i=1
(−1)iχi = 0,
contradicting the fact that the system in (8) has full (row) rank. Note that the size of the support
of (x, z) is
|T1|+ |X|+ |Y | (9)
by definition. On the other hand, the rank of the system in (8) is
|T1|+ |T2|+ 1 ≤ |T1|+ (|X|+ |Y | − k) + 1,
where k is the number of components formed by the edges in T2. The rank of (8) must be at least
the size of the support, and this is only the case when k = 1; i.e., when T2 forms a tree spanning
X ∪ Y . Since G is bipartite, X must be fully contained in one side of the bipartition of V , and Y
must be fully contained in the other. Since Y is a vertex cover in G by (b), every edge in E must
have exactly one endpoint in Y . uunionsq
2.2 Blocking sets in sparse graphs via iterative rounding
In this section we propose an iterative rounding (IR) type algorithm to compute a blocking set in
a given sparse graph G = (V,E). Recall that this means that there is a fixed parameter ω > 0 such
that the graph induced by any set S of vertices has at most ω|S| edges. Recall that we also initially
assume that the underlying graph G is bipartite.
7Fig. 1. The figure shows the structure of a bad extreme point. White nodes correspond to X vertices, dark ones to
vertices in Y , and the squares are O-vertices. Edges in T1 are displayed as dashed lines, and those in T2 as solid, thick
ones.
The algorithm we propose follows the standard IR paradigm (e.g., see [9]) in many ways: given
some instance of the blocking set problem, we first solve LP (PB) and obtain an extreme point
solution (x, z). We now generate a smaller sub-instance of GBS such that (a) the projection of (x, z)
onto the sub-instance is feasible, and (b) any integral solution to the sub-instance can cheaply be
extended to a solution of the original GBS instance. In particular, the reader will see the standard
steps familiar from other IR algorithms: if there is an edge uv ∈ E1 with zuv = 0 then we may
simply drop the edge, if zuv ≥ 1/3 then we include the edge into the blocking set, and if xu = 1 for
some vertex, then we may install one unit of x-value at u permanently and delete u and all incident
edges.
The problem is that the feasible region of (PB) has bad extreme points, even if the underlying
graph is sparse and bipartite. We will exploit the structural properties documented in Lemma 3
and show that a small number of edges can be added to our blocking set even in this case. Crucially,
these edges will have to come from both E1 and E2.
In an iteration of the algorithm, we are given a sub-instance of GBS. We first solve (PB) for
this instance, and obtain an optimal basic solution (x, z). Inductively we maintain the following:
The algorithm computes a set Bˆ ⊆ E of edges, and vector xˆ ∈ RV such that
[I1] xˆu + xˆv ≥ 1 for all uv ∈ E \ Bˆ,
[I2] 1T xˆ ≤ ν, and
[I3] |Bˆ| ≤ (2ω + 1) · 1T z,
where ω is the sparsity parameter introduced above. Let us first assume that the extreme point
solution (x, z) is good. In this case we proceed according to one of the following cases:
Case 1. (∃u ∈ V with xu = 1) In this case, all edges incident to u are covered. We obtain a
subinstance of GBS by removing u and all incident edges from G, and by reducing ν by 1.
Case 2. (∃uv ∈ E with zuv = 0) In this case, obtain a new instance of GBS by removing uv from
E1, and adding it to E2.
Case 3. (∃uv ∈ E1 with zuv ≥ 1/3) In this case add uv to the approximate blocking set B, and
remove uv from E1.
In each of these three cases, we inductively solve the generated sub-instance of GBS. If this subin-
stance is the empty graph, then we can clearly return the empty set.
8Let us now consider the case where (x, z) is a bad extreme point. This case will constitute a
leaf of the recursion tree, and we will show that we can directly find a small blocking set. In the
following lemma, we define the sets X,Y,O ⊆ V as in Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. Let (x, z) be a bad extreme point, and let ν be the current bound on 1Tx. Then (|X|+
|Y |)/2 < ν < |Y |.
Proof. Lemma 3 (b) shows that Y is a vertex cover in the current graph G. Hence, if ν ≥ |Y | then
we could simply let xˆu = 1 for all u ∈ Y and choose B to be the empty blocking set. This also
implies that |Y | > |X| as otherwise
1Tx = (1− α)|X|+ α|Y | ≥ |Y | > ν,
contradicting feasibility. To see the lower-bound, recall that (6) is tight by assumption, and thus
ν = (1− α)|X|+ α|Y | > 2|Y |+ |X|
3
>
|X|+ |Y |
2
,
where the first inequality uses the fact that α > 2/3 from Lemma 3, and the last inequality follows
as |Y | > |X|. uunionsq
We can use this bound on ν to prove that we can find small blocking sets given a bad extreme
point for (PB).
Lemma 5. Given a bad extreme point (x, z) to (PB), we can find a blocking set Bˆ ⊆ E, and
corresponding xˆ such that 1T xˆ ≤ ν, and |Bˆ| ≤ (2ω + 1) · 1T z.
Proof. We will construct a blocking set Bˆ as follows: let xˆu = 1 for a carefully chosen set Yˆ of ν
vertices from the set Y , and let xˆu = 0 for all other vertices in V . Recall once more from Lemma
3 (b) that Y is a vertex cover in G, and hence it suffices to choose
Bˆ =
⋃
u∈Y \Yˆ
δ(u) =
⋃
u∈Y \Yˆ
(
δE1(u) + δE2(u)
)
(10)
as our blocking set, where δEi(u) denotes the set of Ei edges incident to vertex u. Let (a, b, γ) be the
optimal dual solution of (DB) corresponding to extreme point (x, z). Then note that complementary
slackness together with the fact that zuv > 0 for all uv ∈ E1 implies that auv = 1 for these edges as
well. Thus γ is an upper bound on the number E1-edges incident to a vertex u by dual feasibility.
With (10) we therefore obtain
|Bˆ| ≤
∑
u∈Y \Yˆ
(γ + |δE2(u)|) ≤ (|Y | − ν)γ +
∑
u∈Y \Yˆ
|δE2(u)|. (11)
Lemma 3 (c) shows that each E2 edge is incident to one X, and one Y vertex. As the subgraph
induced by X and Y is sparse, there therefore must be a vertex u1 ∈ Y of degree at most ω(|X|+
|Y |)/|Y |. Removing this vertex from G leaves a sparse graph, and we can therefore find a vertex u2
of degree at most ω(|X|+ |Y |−1)/(|Y |−1). Repeating this |Y |−ν times we pick a set u1, . . . , u|Y |−ν
of vertices such that
|Y |−ν∑
i=1
|δE2(ui)| ≤
|Y |−ν∑
i=1
ω(|X|+ |Y | − i)
|Y | − i ≤ (|Y | − ν) ·
ω(|X|+ |Y |)
ν
≤ 2ω(|Y | − ν), (12)
9where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4. We now let Yˆ = Y \ {u1, . . . , u|Y |−ν}, and hence
let xˆu = 1 for u ∈ Yˆ , and xˆu = 0 for all other vertices u ∈ V ; (11) and (12) together imply that
|Bˆ| ≤ (|Y | − ν)(γ + 2ω) ≤ (2ω + 1)γ(Y − ν),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that γ ≥ 1. Lemma 3(c) shows that each edge
e ∈ E has exactly one endpoint in Y . Applying complementary slackness together with the fact
that xu > 0 for all u ∈ Y , we can therefore rewrite the objective function of (DB) as
1Ta+ 1T b− γ ν = γ(|Y | − ν).
The lemma follows. uunionsq
We can now put things together.
Lemma 6. Given an instance of GBS, the above procedure terminates with a set Bˆ ⊆ E, and
xˆ ∈ RV such that 1T xˆ ≤ ν, and xˆu + xˆv ≥ 1 for all uv ∈ E \ Bˆ. The set Bˆ has size at most
(2ω + 1)1T z, where (x, z) is an optimal solution to (PB) for the given GBS instance.
Proof. The proof uses the usual induction on the recursion depth. Let us first consider the case
where the current instance is a leaf of the recursion tree. The lemma follows vacuously if the graph
in the given GBS instance is empty. Otherwise it follows immediately from Lemma 5.
Any internal node of recursion tree corresponds to an instance of GBS where (x, z) is a good
extreme point. We claim that, no matter which one of the above cases we are in, we have that (a)
a suitable projection of (x, z) yields a feasible solution for the created GBS sub-instance, and (b)
we can augment an approximate blocking set for this sub-instance to obtain a good blocking set for
the instance given in this iteration. We proceed by looking at the three cases discussed above.
Case 1. Let (x′, z′) be the natural projection of (x, z) onto the GBS sub-instance; i.e., x′v is set to
xv for all vertices in V − u, and z′vw = zvw for the remaining edges vw ∈ E1 \ δ(u). This solution
is easily verified to be feasible. Inductively, we therefore know that we obtain a blocking set B¯ and
corresponding vector x¯ such that B¯ has no more than (2ω + 1) 1T z¯ ≤ (2ω + 1) 1T z elements, and
1T x¯ ≤ ν − 1. Thus, letting xˆv = x¯v for all v ∈ V − u, and xˆu = 1 together with Bˆ = B¯ gives a
feasible solution for the original GBS instance.
Case 2. The argument for this case is virtually identical to that of Case 1, and we omit the details.
Case 3. Once again we project the current solution (x, z) onto the GBS subinstance; i.e., let
x′ = x, and z′qr = zqr for all qr ∈ E1 − uv. Clearly (x′, z′) is feasible for the GBS subinstance, and
inductively we therefore obtain a vector x¯ and corresponding feasible blocking set B¯ of size at most
(2ω + 1) · 1T z′. Adding uv to B¯ yields a feasible blocking set Bˆ for the original instance together
with xˆ = x¯. Its size is at most (2ω + 1) 1T z′ + 1 ≤ (2ω + 1) 1T z as ω ≥ 1. uunionsq
Suppose now that we are given a non-bipartite, sparse instance of the blocking set problem:
G = (V,E) is a general sparse graph, and ν > 0 is a parameter. We create a bipartite graph H in
the usual way: for each vertex u ∈ V create two copies u1 and u2 and add them to H. For each
edge uv ∈ E, add two edges u1v2 and u2v1 to H. The new blocking set instance is given by (H, ν ′)
where ν ′ = 2ν.
Given a feasible solution (x, z) to (PB) for the instance (G, ν) , we let x
′
ui = xu for all u ∈ V
and i ∈ {1, 2}, and z′uivj = zuv for all edges uivj . For any edge uivj in H, we now have
x′ui + x
′
vj + zuivj = xu + xv + zuv ≥ 1,
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and 1Tx′ ≤ 21Tx ≤ 2ν. Thus, (x′, z′) is feasible to (PB) for instance (H, ν ′), and its value is at
most twice that of 1T z. Let xˆ, Bˆ be a feasible solution to the instance on graph H. Then let
B = {uv ∈ E : u1v2 or u2v1 are in Bˆ},
and note that B has size at most that of Bˆ. Also let xu = (xˆu1 + xˆu2)/2 for all u ∈ V . Clearly,
1Tx ≤ ν, and for any edge uv ∈ E, we have
xu + xv ≥ xˆu1 + xˆu2 + xˆv1 + xˆv2
2
,
and the right-hand side is at least 1 if none of the two edges u1v2, u2v1 is in Bˆ. This shows feasibility
of the pair x,B. In order to prove Theorem 2 it now remains to show that graph H is sparse. Pick
any set S of vertices in H, and let
S′ = {v ∈ V : at least one of v1 and v2 are in S}.
Then |S′| ≤ |S|, and the number of edges of H[S] is at most twice the number of edges in G[S′],
and hence bounded by 2ω |S|; we let ω′ = 2ω be the sparsity parameter of H. Let (x, z) and (x′, z′)
be optimal basic solutions to (PB) for instances (G, ν), and (H, ν
′), respectively. The blocking set
B for G has size no more than
(2ω′ + 1)1T z′ ≤ 2(4ω + 1)1T z.
Thus, we have proven Theorem 2.
3 From blocking set to balanced allocation
Let G = (V,E) be an instance of the matching game, B ⊆ E a blocking set, and x ∈ RV+ s.t.
1Tx ≤ ν(V ) (S1)
xi + xj ≥ 1 ∀ij ∈ E \B. (S2)
In this section we will show that, for any maximum matching M ′ in G′ = G[E\B], we can efficiently
find a vector x¯ that satisfies (S1), (S2), as well as the balancedness condition
x¯i − αi = x¯j − αj ∀ij ∈M ′, (S3)
thus resulting in a stable outcome.
Following the work of Bateni et al. [2] this task reduces to finding a point in the intersection
of core and prekernel of the matching game. We describe an elegant algorithm due to Faigle et
al. [7] (in the matching game special case); building on a local-search algorithm due to Maschler,
and Stearns [14], the authors presented an algorithm that efficiently computes prekernel elements
of general TU games (under mild conditions).
3.1 From prekernel to balancedness
We define the prekernel of the matching game first. For a pair of vertices i, j ∈ V , define the surplus
of i over j as
sij(x) = max{1− xk − xi : ik ∈ E′, k 6= j},
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where E′ = E\B is the set of non-blocking set edges in G3. We will omit the argument x if it is clear
from the context. For convenience, we will let eij and eji be fixed edges incident to vertices i and j
that define the respective surpluses; i.e. sij(x) = 1− x(eij) and sji(x) = 1− x(eji), where x(uv) is
the value of edge uv and is a short-hand for the sum xu + xv of the values of the incident vertices.
The prekernel of the matching game is the set of all non-negative vectors x with 1Tx = ν(V ), and
sij(x) = sji(x) for all i, j ∈ V .
Consider some matching M ′ ∈ G[E′] and let αu be the alternative of u in graph G′ with respect
to this matching (see (1)). Then one sees that x¯i − αi = x¯j − αj if and only if sij(x¯) = sji(x¯).
Hence, we will now describe an algorithm that finds a vector x¯ satisfying (S1), (S2), and the
following reformulation of (S3):
sij = sji ∀ij ∈ E′. (S3’)
From now on, we will assume that sij ≥ sji for all ij ∈ E′. Suppose that x satisfies (S1) and (S2),
but not (S3’), and let
si1j1 ≥ si2j2 ≥ . . . ≥ simjm
be a list of the surpluses of edges in E′. Let 1 ≤ p ≤ m be smallest such that sipjp > sjpip , and
define s(x) = sipjp as the largest surplus of any violated pair. Let S(x) and I(x) be the sets of all
pairs whose surplus is larger than or equal to s(x), respectively; i.e.,
S(x) = {ij : sij(x) > s(x)}
I(x) = {ij : sij(x) = s(x)}.
Let µ > 0 such that sipjp − 2µ = sjpip for some 1 ≤ p ≤ m. We then consider the following natural
local shift proposed by Maschler:
x′u =

xu + µ u = ip
xu − µ u = jp
xu otherwise,
for all u ∈ V . We collect a few useful observations in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 ([7]).
(i) sipjp(x
′) = sjpip(x′) = s(x)− µ
(ii) s(x′) ≤ s(x), and if s(x′) = s(x) then |I(x′)| < |I(x)|
(iii) For ij ∈ S(x), none of eij and eji change value, and if some edge e 6= ij incident to i or j
decreases in value, then its new value is larger than that of eij and eji. Hence, sij(x
′) = sij(x)
for all ij ∈ S(x).
(iv) x′ satisfies (S1) and (S2) if x does.
Proof. Note that x′(e) = x(e) + µ for all e ∈ δ(ip) \ {ipjp}, and hence sipjp(x′) = sipjp(x) − µ.
Similarly, all edges e 6= ipjp incident to jp have x′(e) = x(e)−µ, and hence sjpip(x′) = sjpip(x) +µ.
This implies (i).
3 We abuse notation slightly in this definition of sij , and let sij(x) = −xi if i has no neighbour other than j.
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Note that x′(e) < x(e) only if e is incident to jp. Furthermore,
for such edges e, we must have
x(eipjp) + 2µ = x(ejpip) ≤ x(e), (13)
and hence x′(e) ≥ x(eipjp) + µ. Similarly, if x′(e) > x(e) then e
must be incident to ip, and thus x
′(e) ≥ x(eipjp) + µ.
This has several immediate consequences. For a pair ij ∈ S(x), the x-values of eij eji remain the
same, and they will remain surplus-defining edges for sij(x
′) and sji(x′), respectively. In particular,
we have sij(x
′) = sji(x′), proving (iii).
First consider some pair ij ∈ I(x); by the above reasoning, sij(x) can not increase, but may
decrease. If it decreases, then it decreases by µ. Similarly, sji(x) may increase, but in this case,
sji(x
′) ≤ sipjp(x) − µ. By (iii), no pair ij ∈ S(x) changes its surpluses, and hence s(x′) ≤ s(x).
Furthermore, if s(x′) = s(x) then I(x′) ( I(x) as the pair ipjp certainly decreases its surplus. This
implies (ii).
Finally assume that x satisfies (S1) and (S2). It is clear that the local shift preserves (S1).
Consider some edge e ∈ E′; since (S2) holds for x, we have x(e) ≥ 1. Suppose that x′(e) < x(e).
Then e must be incident to jp, and clearly x(eipjp) + 2µ ≤ x(ejpip) ≤ x(e), for some µ > 0. Note
that x(eipjp) ≥ 1 as x satisfies (S2), and hence x(e) ≥ 1 + 2µ. This proves (iv) as x(e) decreases by
no more than µ. uunionsq
From (ii) we obtain the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 1. s(x) strictly decreases after at most |E′| local shifts.
One could now suspect that a sequence of local shifts would converge to a prekernel element,
but this is in fact not known. Stearns [14] showed, however, that if one picks a maximal violated pair
ipjp then the method can indeed be shown to converge, but no polynomial bound on the number
of shifts is known. Faigle et al. [7] propose the following elegant fix. Consider the following linear
program with variables y ∈ RE′+ and δ ∈ R. We let ∆(x) be the smallest surplus of any pair in S(x),
and let ∆(x) = 0 if S(x) is empty.
max δ (P(x))
s.t. y(V ) = 1Tx (14)
y(eij) = x(eij) ∀ij ∈ S(x) (15)
1− y(eij) ≥ 1− y(e) ∀ij ∈ S(x),∀e ∈ δ(i) \ {ij} (16)
1− y(e) ≤ ∆(x)− δ ∀ij 6∈ S(x),∀e ∈ δ(i) \ {ij} (17)
y(e) ≥ 1 ∀e ∈ E′ (18)
y, δ ≥ 0
Let x ∈ RE′+ satisfy (S1) and (S2). Then y := x and δ = ∆(x) − s(x) is a feasible solution to
(P(x)). Faigle et al. show a stronger statement. Consider a sequence
x = x1, x2, . . . , xp
of edge vectors such that for all 2 ≤ i ≤ p, xi arises from xi−1 through a local shift operation. Note
that Lemma 7 implies that S(x1) ⊆ S(x2) ⊆ . . . ⊆ S(xp).
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Lemma 8 ([7]). Suppose that S(xp) = S(x1). For 1 ≤ i ≤ p, define yi = xi and let δi = ∆(xi)−
s(xi). Then (yi, δi) is feasible for (P(x)), and δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤ . . . ≤ δp.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction of i. For i = 1, we have already shown that (y1, δ1) is
feasible for (P(x)). Now assume that the induction hypothesis is true for i ≥ 1. We show that
(yi+1, δi+1) is feasible. It is easy to see that the local shift preserves constraints (14) and (15).
Lemma 7.(iii) implies that (16) continues to hold. The left-hand side of (17) is at most s(xi+1), and
hence at most ∆(xi+1) − δi+1. Lemma 7.(ii) together with the fact that ∆(xi) = ∆(xi+1) implies
that δi ≤ δi+1. Finally, the core condition (18) holds because of Lemma 7.(iv). uunionsq
The idea of Faigle et al. is now as follows: let x be an edge-vector that satisfies (S1) and (S2).
Solve (P(x)), and let (y, δ) be the optimal solution. We have that s(y) ≤ s(x),
sij(y) = sji(y),
for all ij ∈ S(x), and therefore S(x) ⊆ S(y). If this inclusion is strict, then we have made progress
by solving the LP. Assume that S(x) = S(y). In this case, we observe that the maximum value of
1− y(e) over all left-hand sides of (17) is exactly s(y), and we therefore have
δ = ∆(x)− s(y).
Apply local moves to y until s(y) decreases. We know from Corollary 1 that this takes at most |E′|
steps. Let y′ be the resulting vector. Clearly, S(y′) ⊆ S(y), and we claim that this inclusion must
be strict. In fact, if not then Lemma 8 implies that (y′, δ′) is feasible for (P(x)) for
δ′ = ∆(x)− s(y′) > ∆(x)− s(y) = δ,
where the inequality follows from that fact that s(y′) < s(y). This contradicts the optimality of
(y, δ) for (P(x)).
Theorem 3 ([7]). Given a point x ∈ RE′+ that satisfies (S1) and (S2) we can compute a point in
the prekernel using |E′|2 local shifts, and solving |E′| LPs of the type (P(x)).
4 Discussion
In this paper we studied network bargaining games, and took a particular interest in unstable games.
We showed that when the underlying network, G = (V,E), is sparse, we are able to identify an
approximation of the smallest blocking set, B, and we explained how it is possible to efficiently find
a balanced (and thus stable) outcome in the network game induced by the graph, G′ = (V,E \B).
There are several interesting directions in which this work could be taken. For example, one could
allow for more complex utility functions [4] or allow agents to make more complex deals.
We make the observation that in games defined by G and G′ we are always working with
maximum matchings, M and M ′ on the respective networks. Note that the matching M ′ is no larger,
and may in fact be smaller than matching M . Therefore, we achieve balancedness by subsidizing
the game to an extent of |M | − |M ′|. This difference is clearly at most |B|, and hence it makes
sense to use as small a blocking set as we can find. Bachrach et al looked at stabilizing coalitions
(in non-network settings) by using external payments, and introduced the cost of stability as the
minimal external payment needed to stabilize a game [1]. An interesting future direction might
be to explore relationships and possible tradeoffs between the cost of stability and the size of the
blocking set.
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